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Appendix to “The Marginal Revenue Rule in Cost-Benefit Analysis”
Transfers and Redistribution in the Cost-Benefit Analysis of Tax Regulations
David Weisbach, Daniel Hemel, and Jennifer Nou
The University of Chicago Law School†
September 10, 2018 – DRAFT
This document is an appendix to The Marginal Revenue Rule in Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Tax Notes (Sept. 10, 2018). In that publication, we proposed a method of
performing cost-benefit analysis of tax related-regulations. The approach—which we
called the marginal revenue rule—instructs that the social benefit of an increase in
revenue generated by a tax regulation is equal to the net increase in revenue resulting
from reporting and behavioral changes induced by the regulation. The total social benefit
of a tax regulation equals the net increase in revenue resulting from reporting and
behavioral changes plus any non-revenue-based benefits (e.g., health benefits from a
tobacco tax regulation or environmental benefits from a gas tax regulation). The social
cost of a tax regulation is the net increase in administrative and compliance costs
resulting from the regulation as well as any non-tax-related costs (e.g., health costs,
environmental costs). The net effect of the regulation is the difference between the social
benefits and the costs.
Tax regulations will often affect the total amount of revenue that the government
collects. In analyzing the welfare effects of tax regulations that raise or reduce revenue,
regulators must decide when—if ever—a transfer of money from a taxpayer to the
government should be counted as a net social benefit or cost. In The Marginal Revenue
Rule in Cost-Benefit Analysis¸ we argued that the most transparent approach to the
problem is to consider a dollar to be worth the same in private hands and in government
hands, and then to estimate the efficiency effects of the proposed regulation under that
assumption. The marginal revenue rule allows regulators to identify circumstances in
which increases or decreases in taxes paid do affect social welfare, notwithstanding the
equal weight placed on revenue in public and private hands. Regulators would then report
the efficiency effects of the proposed regulation (estimated via the marginal revenue rule)
and would separately state the distributional and revenue effects.
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This Appendix provides a further discussion of the assumption that revenue is worth
the same in public and private hands. For ease of exposition, we will use the letter g to
denote the ratio of (a) the social value of a dollar in the government’s hands to (b) the
social value of a dollar in private hands. If g > 1, then the social value of a dollar in the
government’s hands is greater than the social value of a dollar in private hands, and pure
transfers from private parties to the government increase social welfare. If g < 1, then the
social value of a dollar in the government’s hands is less than the social value of a dollar
in private hands, and pure transfers from private parties to the government reduce social
welfare. If g = 1, a dollar is worth the same in private hands as in the government’s
hands.
The marginal revenue rule can be tailored to any value of g. To do so, an analyst
would calculate the sum of (1) the change in revenue due to behavioral and reporting
changes and (2) the total change in revenue multiplied by g – 1. But although the
marginal revenue rule can be implemented for any value of g, we believe that the best
approach for Treasury and the IRS would be to calculate the efficiency effects of changes
in tax revenue on the assumption that a dollar is worth the same regardless of who holds
it. This implies setting g = 1.
We elaborate on this argument in the sections that follow. First, we explain why g =
1 when existing tax and spending policies are set optimally. This proposition is firmly
rooted in economic theory—we expect that economists and economically trained scholars
will accept this statement as true. Second, we explain why Treasury and the IRS should
produce estimates of the efficiency effects of changes in tax revenue using the g = 1
assumption even when they do not believe that existing tax and spending policies are set
optimally. This argument is a normative claim based upon epistemic limitations,
institutional design considerations, and democratic values rather than a statement based
upon economic theory alone.
Although we focus here on how to value changes in government revenues that result
from tax regulations, the arguments apply equally to any revenue changes from any other
regulation. Similar arguments also apply to regulations that affect the distribution of
resources among households with different income levels. In the final part, we consider
how the arguments for changes to tax revenues apply to other effects of a regulation. In
particular, we explain that the logic behind the g = 1 assumption for tax revenues also
militates against the use of distributional weights when analyzing the efficiency effects of
tax regulations more generally. This is not because inequality and distribution are
unimportant—to the contrary, we believe that distributional considerations are, and
should be, central to the design of the tax system. Still, we believe that there are better
2
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ways to account for the distributional consequences of tax regulations than to integrate
distributional weights into efficiency analysis.
A1 Transfers to the Government Do Not Affect Social Welfare When Tax and Spending
Policies Are Set Optimally
A widely understood proposition in economics is that the taxation of income,
consumption, and wealth generates “excess burden,” or “deadweight loss.” The excess
burden is the efficiency loss that results from the substitution effects of a tax. To illustrate
using a labor income tax (which is the primary source of revenue for the U.S. federal
government): Imagine that a taxpayer is indifferent between (a) allocating an additional
hour to work, earning $100, and paying a tax on labor income of 30%, which would leave
her with $70 after taxes, or (b) allocating an additional hour to leisure. Society is $30
better off when the taxpayer allocates the hour to work because the government raises
revenue of $30, which it can use to provide public goods or to fund rebates to taxpayers.
A small increase in the tax rate will cause the taxpayer to reallocate the hour from work
to leisure—i.e., to substitute leisure for labor. The taxpayer is approximately as well off
as before, but society is $30 worse off when the taxpayer chooses to allocate the hour to
leisure rather than work. The excess burden of the increase in the labor income tax rate is
equal to the sum of the efficiency losses from all taxpayers who substitute leisure for
labor as a result of the change.1
Not all taxes lead to excess burdens. Lump-sum taxes, or “head taxes,” do not
generate any excess burden. If taxpayers have to pay the same amount to the government
regardless of how much income they earn, the tax system will not induce taxpayers to
substitute leisure for labor. Indeed, the excess burden of a tax often is defined as the
difference between total utility when the tax is imposed and total utility when an
equivalent amount is raised from each taxpayer through a lump-sum tax.2

1

The excess burden of an income tax also includes the efficiency losses that occur when taxpayers
shift from higher-paying jobs to jobs that pay less but lead to greater enjoyment (because there is no tax on
joy).
2

See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in I Handbook of
Public Economics 61, 67-73 (A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds., 1985). This definition allows for a
distinction between substitution effects and income effects. The substitution effect of a labor income tax is
the increase in leisure (reduction in labor) when the tax reduces the after-tax wage and thereby makes
leisure relatively more attractive than before. The income effect of a labor income tax is the increase in

3
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Why, then, do societies choose to impose income taxes rather than lump-sum taxes?
One answer is that the taxation of income leads to distributional benefits in addition to
excess burdens.3 The marginal utility of income—the benefit that an individual derives
from an additional dollar after taxes—is generally thought to be diminishing as income
rises. That is, an extra dollar matters less to billionaires Jeff Bezos and Bill Gates than to
median-income Americans, and an extra dollar matters less to median-income Americans
than to the very poorest individuals. In comparison to lump-sum taxation, a tax system
that requires individuals with higher incomes to pay more in taxes redistributes income
from higher-income to lower-income individuals. Redistribution from high-income
individuals (for whom the marginal utility of income is low) to low-income individuals
(for whom the marginal utility of income is high) increases total utility (i.e., social
welfare). The more progressive a tax system is, the greater the distributional benefit (until
the point that the tax system equalizes the marginal utility of income across all
individuals).
The design of a tax system therefore involves a tradeoff between excess burdens and
distributional benefits. In the optimal income tax system (i.e., the system that maximizes
social welfare), tax schedules are set such that the excess burden of a marginal increase in
the progressivity of the income tax is precisely equal to the distributional benefit. If the
excess burden of an increase in the progressivity of the income tax is less than the
distributional benefit, then the government can increase social welfare by making the tax
system more progressive. If the excess burden of an increase in the progressivity of the
income tax exceeds the distributional benefit, then the government can increase social
welfare by making the tax system less progressive (i.e., closer to a lump-sum tax).
For ease of exposition, it is helpful to imagine the optimal tax system as combining a
lump-sum component with a proportional tax on income. Let k represent the lump-sum
component (i.e., the amount that each taxpayer transfers to the government regardless of
her income); let t represent the tax rate; and let y represent each taxpayer’s income. Thus,

labor (reduction in leisure) that arises because the tax has made individuals poorer, thus leading them to
work more. Excess burden is a function of the substitution effect, not the income effect.
3

The discussion in text assumes a utilitarian social welfare function with diminishing marginal utility
of income. These assumptions are not strictly necessary to the analysis: the prescriptions of optimal tax
theory can be modified for any social welfare function. See J. A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of
Optimum Income Taxation, 38 Rev. Econ. Stud. 175 (1971); Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal
Tax Systems, 4 J. Econ. Perspectives 157, 163-64 (1990).

4
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each taxpayer transfers k + ty to the government.4 (Our actual income tax system is much
more intricate than this, and many transfers to individuals take the form of in-kind
benefits such as Food Stamps and housing vouchers rather than checks; incorporating
these intricacies would make the math more complicated but would not alter the
fundamental insight.) To restate the conclusion of the previous paragraph using our new
algebraic notation: In the optimal tax system, k and t are set such that the excess burden
from marginally reducing k and raising t so as to hold total revenue constant is precisely
equal to the distributional benefit.
So far we have focused solely on the tax side of the equation. We now turn to the
spending side. The government uses the revenues it raises from taxation to provide public
goods, such as roads, national defense, and environmental protection. The size of
government is at the optimum when the social benefit of spending an additional dollar to
provide public goods is equal to the social cost of raising an additional dollar in revenue.
If the benefit of providing additional public goods exceeds the social cost of raising the
requisite revenue, then the government can increase social welfare by spending more and
taxing more. If the social benefit of providing additional public goods is less than the
social cost, then the government can increase social welfare by spending less and taxing
less.
These observations inform our estimate of g, which—recall—is the ratio of the social
value of one dollar in the government’s hands to one dollar in private hands. One possible
view is that analysts should proceed on the assumption that g > 1 due to the excess
burden of income taxation. To illustrate: Assume, in line with some empirical estimates,
that the excess burden of raising an additional dollar in revenue through the income tax is
approximately 25 cents.5 One might therefore think that g = 1.25: a lump-sum transfer of
one dollar from a private party to the government increases social welfare by 25 cents
because it allows the government to raise one fewer dollar through distortionary income
taxation, and the government should invest in additional public projects only if the social

4

Although this simplified tax system involves a flat tax rate, it can be made quite progressive in
practice if k is a negative number. Imagine, for example, that k is -$10,000 and t is 40%. An individual
earning $50,000 would owe -$10,000 + 40% x $50,000 = $10,000 in taxes, for an effective rate of 20%. An
individual earning $1,000,000 would owe -$10,000 + 40% x $1,0000 = $390,000 in taxes, for an effective
rate of 39%. An individual earning nothing would receive a $10,000 check from the government.
5

See, e.g., Edgar K. Browning, On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 11
(1987); Don Fullerton, Reconciling Recent Estimates of the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation, 81 Am.
Econ. Rev. 302 (1991).
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benefit is at least 1.25 times the budgetary cost. This view is reflected in a 1992 OMB
circular, which suggests that agencies should assume a 25 percent excess burden when
considering the costs of public projects.6
The 1992 OMB circular reflected the then-current state of economic theory. In more
recent years, economists have come to understand that g = 1, not 1.25, as long as the
existing tax system is optimal.7 To understand this reasoning, recall that a lump-sum tax
generates no excess burden. In theory, the federal government could raise revenue for a
new project by increasing the lump-sum component (k). If k is negative (or equivalently,
if the government makes transfers in cash or in kind to individuals with low incomes),
then the federal government could offset the cost of the new project by reducing the
amount that it transfers. There would be no excess burden if, for example, the
government reduced transfers to everyone who receives a net transfer by one dollar and
raised taxes on everyone who pays net taxes by one dollar.
What if the federal government does not raise revenue for a new project by
increasing the lump-sum component (k) but instead increases the income tax (t)? Still, as
long as we assume that the existing tax system is optimal, the social welfare effect of the
increase in t is the same as the welfare effect of a revenue-equivalent increase in k. Recall
that in the optimal tax system, k and t are set such that the increase in excess burden from
marginally reducing k and raising t while holding revenue constant is equal to the
distributional benefit—i.e., there is no social welfare gain or loss. Thus, when the
government raises an additional dollar in revenue through the income tax, we can think of
it as if the government (1) raised an additional dollar in revenue through the lump-sum
component, and then (2) reduced the lump-sum component by dollar and raised the
income tax to hold revenue constant. The first move generated no excess burden, and the
excess burden of the second move was offset by the distributional benefit. It is therefore
optimal for the government to spend up to the point that an additional dollar of spending
generates social benefits of one dollar (not one dollar plus the excess burden).
This same logic also leads to the conclusion that if tax and spending policies are set
optimally, a marginal increase in revenue does not increase social welfare unless it is

6

Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-94: Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost
Analysis of Federal Programs 13 (1992).
7

See Bas Jacobs, The Marginal Cost of Public Funds Is One at the Optimal Tax System, 25 Int’l Tax
& Pub. Fin. 1 (2018); Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of
Taxation, 49 Nat’l Tax J. 513 (1996).
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associated with behavioral or reporting changes. (We explain above why additional
revenues resulting from behavioral or reporting changes do translate into net social
benefits.) Consider a transfer from taxpayers to the government that is not based upon the
taxpayer’s income. A transfer unrelated to income is equivalent to an increase in the
lump-sum component (k). The revenue can be used (1) to reduce the tax on income (t)
while holding total revenue constant, or it can be used (2) to finance additional public
investment. Again, the excess burden and distributional effects of raising k and lowering t
while holding revenue constant are equal if tax policies are set optimally, so the first
option neither increases or decreases social welfare. And again, the social benefit of an
additional dollar of public investment is one dollar if spending policies are set optimally,
so the second option also does not increase social welfare.
Next, consider a transfer that is based upon the taxpayer’s income. An income-based
transfer is equivalent to a change in the income tax schedule. If the current tax schedule is
set optimally, such that the excess burden and distributional effects of marginal changes
are offsetting, then a marginal increase in the income tax (or equivalently, an incomebased transfer) does not increase social welfare.
To sum up so far: The optimal income tax system is one in which the excess burden
from a marginal increase in the income-based component is equal to the distributional
benefit. Thus, from a social welfare perspective, it does not matter whether the next
dollar of revenue comes through the lump-sum component or the income-based
component. For that reason, the size of government is at the optimum when the social
benefit of an additional one dollar of public spending is one dollar. Under those
conditions, a transfer of one dollar from taxpayers to the government does not affect
social welfare unless, as emphasized in the report, it is associated with a behavioral or
reporting change.
A2 Implications for Treasury and the IRS
The analysis in the previous section proceeded on the assumption that tax and
spending policies are set optimally. This is a very strong assumption. But as noted in the
introduction to this Appendix, our argument that Treasury and the IRS should set g = 1
when estimating the efficiency effects of tax regulations does not depend upon the
assumption that existing tax and spending policies are optimal. In this section, we explain
why the case for g = 1 remains compelling even when the optimality assumption is
relaxed
A2.1

Agnosticism
7
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Consider the implications for cost-benefit analysis if tax and spending policies are
not optimal. Now, a transfer of an additional dollar from taxpayers to the government
may have a first-order effect on social welfare. If government spending is too low, and if
the one dollar transfer is used to finance additional government spending, then the
transfer increases social welfare. If, conversely, government spending is too high, and if
the one dollar transfer is used to finance additional government spending, then the
transfer decreases social welfare.
But what if instead of going toward additional spending, the one dollar transfer is
used to finance an income tax cut? Recall that a one dollar transfer that is not linked to
income is equivalent to an increase in the lump-sum component (k). A marginal increase
in the lump-sum component that is used to lower the tax rate on income reduces the
progressivity of the overall tax system. If the level of redistribution is currently too low
(i.e., if the distributional benefit of a marginal increase in progressivity is greater than the
excess burden), then a change that makes the tax system marginally less progressive also
reduces social welfare. If the level of redistribution is currently too high (i.e., if the
distributional benefit of a marginal increase in progressivity is less than the excess
burden), then a change that makes the tax system marginally less progressive increases
social welfare.
No one knows how a one dollar increase in federal government revenue will be
allocated. If one believes that government spending is too low and that redistribution is
too high, then one should conclude that a lump-sum transfer of one dollar from taxpayers
to the government will increase social welfare. If one believes that government spending
is too high and that redistribution is too low, then one should conclude that a lump-sum
transfer of one dollar from taxpayers to the government will reduce social welfare.
Interestingly, very few people hold either combination of views. Those on the left tend to
think that government spending and redistribution are too low. Those on the right tend to
think that government spending and redistribution are too high. Traditional liberalism and
traditional conservatism both yield ambiguous conclusions regarding the welfare effects
of lump-sum transfers.8

8

The analysis in text assumes that the transfer of an additional dollar from taxpayers to the
government will be used either to finance tax cuts or to fund additional spending. A third possibility is that
the additional dollar will be used to reduce the deficit. Estimates of the welfare effects of lump-sum
transfers would then depend on one’s views regarding the desirability of additional deficit spending.
Determining the optimal size of the deficit is no more straightforward than determining the optimal amount
of public spending or the optimal amount of redistribution. See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew

8
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A2.2

Strategic Considerations

Even if one has settled views about the desirability of additional government
spending and redistribution, and even if these views lead to determinate conclusions
regarding the welfare effects of lump-sum transfers, one still might conclude that
Treasury and the IRS ought to apply the assumption that g = 1 when estimating the
efficiency effects of tax regulations. Imagine, for example, that you believe that the
government spends too much and redistributes too little, and so you believe that lumpsum transfers from taxpayers to the government are welfare-decreasing. Should you want
Treasury and the IRS to incorporate spending and distributional preferences into costbenefit analysis?
Current policy presumably diverges from your preferences because your preferences
do not command majority support. If Treasury and the IRS do incorporate spending and
distributional preferences into cost-benefit analysis, there is no reason to expect that they
will follow your preferences. Indeed, agencies will likely incorporate the preferences of
the current administration and—perhaps—the preferences of Congress. The fact that you
have failed to convince the President and Congress to implement your preferred tax and
spending policies is strong evidence that you also will fail to convince Treasury and the
IRS to incorporate your spending and distributional preferences into efficiency analysis.
The g = 1 assumption reflects a recognition that efficiency analysis is not the place to
refight battles over the size of government and the desirability of additional
redistribution. Over the long run, if Treasury and the IRS adopt inefficient regulations in
order to achieve spending and distributional objectives, there is no reason to think that
those regulations will move the dial on spending or redistribution any closer to your
preferred point. What they will do is reduce efficiency. Put differently, the g = 1
assumption makes sense once one realizes that using regulatory changes to achieve
spending and distributional objectives is ultimately a negative-sum game.
A2.3

Policy Stability

The g = 1 assumption further contributes to the stability of regulatory policies.
Spending and distributional preferences will change from one administration to the next,
and from one Congress to the next. These changes will likely be reflected in adjustments

Weinzierl, An Exploration of Optimal Stabilization Policy, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring
2011, at 209.
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to tax schedules and budgets. Do we want run-of-the-mill tax regulations (e.g., the
reporting threshold for bingo winnings) to be in constant flux as well? Regulatory churn
raises compliance costs and saddles taxpayers with additional uncertainty. Ideally,
administrations with different spending and distributional preferences will be able to keep
regulatory churn to a minimum.
To be sure, this goal can be achieved by assigning any fixed number to g. We could,
for example, arrive at stability if all administrations agreed that g = 0.75 or g = 1.25. One
advantage of the g = 1 assumption is that it functions as a focal point: a natural solution
to a coordination game.9 For example, those who think that the government already is too
large might object to a solution that assigns a positive value to lump-sum transfers; those
who believe that the government is too small might object to a negative value. The g = 1
assumption—which weighs money in private and public hands equally—has the same
focal-point attraction as “down-the-middle” splits in other walks of life.
A2.4

Division of Labor and Specialization

The g = 1 assumption also recognizes the limits of Treasury and the IRS’s
institutional roles. We can imagine a scenario in which each agency comes to its own
conclusion about the optimality of additional spending and redistribution. It seems clear
that such a scenario does not reflect the most efficient allocation of responsibilities across
the federal government. For very good reasons, we divide tasks among different agencies
and seek to avoid redundancies. The same logic would suggest that determining the
optimal level of spending and redistribution is a task that should be assigned to some part
or parts of the government, but not to all.10
Some might argue that spending and distributional policies should be left entirely to
the legislative process. Others might argue that the President properly plays a role. It is
very difficult to argue, though, that spending and distributional policies should be set by a
single agency or Cabinet department. And aside from questions of institutional
competence, there are strong specialization-related reasons for applying the g = 1
assumption when estimating the efficiency effects of tax regulations. The individuals at
Treasury and the IRS who will be responsible for preparing these analyses are experts in
the efficient administration of the tax system. They are not, in general, experts on

9

See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 57 (1960).

10

For an elaboration of this argument, see David A. Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted CostBenefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets Organizational Design, 8 J. Legal Analysis 151 (2015).
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questions of distributive justice. Delegating judgments about the value of g to other areas
of the federal government acknowledges the scope of Treasury and the IRS’s expertise.
A2.5

Transparency and Accountability

Finally, the g = 1 assumption yields benefits of transparency and accountability.
Importantly, the g = 1 assumption does not preclude Treasury and the IRS from including
a discussion of spending and distributional effects in their regulatory impact analyses. It
simply requires that this discussion be separated from the analysis of the regulation’s
efficiency effects. Circular A-4 supports this approach: It instructs agencies that “[y]our
regulatory analysis should provide a separate description of distributional effects . . . so
that decision makers can properly consider them along with the effects on economic
efficiency.”11 The alternative of using a value for g other than one in efficiency analysis
would allow Treasury and the IRS to incorporate their spending and distributional
preferences without making the role of those preferences clear.
If Treasury and the IRS choose to propose an inefficient regulation because they
think it has desirable effects on spending or distribution, they should say so. They should
say, for example, that “the monetized costs of the regulation exceed the benefits by $X,
but we have chosen to pursue it anyway because we want to expand (or shrink) the size
of government and we think this regulation will help us achieve that goal.” Transparency
serves three functions. First, it makes clear to the White House how agencies have arrived
at the regulations they propose. It lays bare where the agency’s expertise ends and its
spending and distributional preferences begin. Second, and relatedly, it allows Congress
to evaluate whether agencies have used their statutory authority to implement the tax
laws efficiently (which is presumably what Congress wants) or to arrive at spending and
distributional results that counteract Congress’s own budgetary and tax policy priorities.12
Third, it clarifies for the public—or, at least, the small segment of the public that reads
and digests regulatory preambles—why Treasury and the IRS have done what they have.
A3

The Role of Distributional Effects in Cost-Benefit Analysis

11

Circular A-4, supra note 6, at 14.

12

On cost-benefit analysis as a tool of presidential and congressional control over agencies, see Eric
A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1137 (2001).
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So far our discussion has focused on the application of cost-benefit analysis to tax
regulations that affect government revenue. In addition to changing government
revenues, regulatory actions, tax and non-tax, also may affect distribution by imposing
additional compliance costs on some taxpayers and/or relieving burdens on others, or by
reallocating tax and non-tax liabilities, or by producing transfers from some individuals
or entities to others.13 Our observations above regarding the appropriate value to use for g
also inform the analysis of regulations that generate distributional effects through
channels other than raising or reducing the amount of government revenue.
Consider a regulation that reduces costs for wealthy individuals by $1 + x and
imposes costs of $1 on poor individuals. The action in question could be anything from a
reconfiguration of a tax form to the re-routing of a highway. Should regulators take
distributional effects into account when deciding whether to adopt the rule? Some
scholars have argued that regulators should apply “distributional weights” to different
individuals based on each individual’s marginal utility of income (or consumption).14 For
example, if the marginal utility of income for poor individuals is double the marginal
utility of income for wealthy individuals, the hypothetical rule should be adopted only if
the benefit to wealthy individuals is at least two times the cost to poor individuals.
The marginal revenue rule does not preclude the use of distributional weights. The
key insight underlying the MRR—that a shift from untaxed to taxed activity or from not
reporting to reporting has no first-order effect on the individual welfare of the marginal
taxpayer but increases social welfare by the amount of revenue raised—applies regardless
of whether distributional weights are applied. Yet for substantially the same reasons that
agencies should proceed on the assumption that g = 1, we think that agencies should
estimate the efficiency effects of regulations without using distributional weights.

13

Consider, for example, the new mortality tables issued by Treasury and the IRS in October 2017 for
determining present value under defined benefit pension plans. See Mortality Tables for Determining
Present Value Under Defined Benefit Pension Plans, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,388 (Oct. 5, 2017). These tables will
be used, among other purposes, to establish minimum amounts for lump-sum payments that plan sponsors
offer to participants in lieu of lifetime annuities. The Internal Revenue Code requires that the lump-sum
payment be at least the present value of the lifetime annuity that the participant otherwise would receive.
I.R.C. § 417(e)(3). The new tables, which assume longer life expectancies, will require sponsors exercising
the lump-sum payment option to offer larger amounts to plan participants. The regulation thereby functions
as a wealth transfer from sponsors to participants in defined benefit pension plans with lump-sum payment
options.
14

See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Distributional Weights: An Overview, 10
Rev. Envtl. Econ. & Pol’y 264 (2016).
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Agencies then should separately state the efficiency, distributional, and overall revenue
effects of the regulation.
First, agencies generally lack the information necessary to assign appropriate
distributional weights. To do so, they would need to know whether the distributional
benefit from an increase in progressivity is greater than the excess burden (and if so, by
how much). If the existing tax system is too progressive (i.e., if the excess burden from a
marginal increase in progressivity exceeds the distributional benefit), then a regulation
that redistributes from the poor to rich would be welfare-enhancing. Unless we know how
much redistribution is optimal and how our existing system fares relative to the optimum,
it is not even clear which individuals should be assigned a greater distributional weight.
Second, and similar to the strategic argument in Section A2.2, attempts to implement
distributional preferences through regulatory changes are likely to be negative sum.
Administrations that favor more redistribution will adopt regulations that increase
redistribution and reduce efficiency, while administrations that favor less redistribution
will adopt regulations that reduce redistribution and reduce efficiency. There is no reason
for any of us to believe that these regulations over the long term will bring the total
amount of redistribution closer to the amount that we consider to be ideal; there is,
however, a strong reason to believe that these regulations will reduce economic
efficiency. Put differently: Redistribution through the adoption of inefficient regulations
becomes much less attractive once one realizes that the other side will play the game too.
The stability and specialization benefits discussed above apply here as well. The
premise that a dollar is worth a dollar regardless of who holds it serves as a focal point
for agreement among administrations with different distributional preferences. This
compromise position strikes us as preferable to the alternative of regulatory churn
whenever a new administration with different distributional preferences takes the reins.
Moreover, agencies generally do not have any expertise in estimating the marginal utility
of consumption at different points in the income distribution, and requiring them to
derive such estimates in the course of cost-benefit analysis would stretch the agencies
well beyond their core competencies.
Last but not least, we believe that transparency and accountability are enhanced
when distributional effects are separately stated. Distributional tables—which show the
effects of policies on individuals or households in different income groups without
assigning distributional weights—should be included alongside an estimate of efficiency
effects. The juxtaposition of efficiency analysis and distributional tables would aid voters
in understanding the extent to which regulations are motivated by distributional goals.
Distributional tables also would assist Congress in deciding whether offsetting tax
13
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schedule adjustments are warranted. And unlike the assignment of distributional weights,
the production of distributional tables lies within the executive branch’s existing
estimating capabilities. Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis routinely produces
distributional tables for various tax policies.15 Extending that capability to other agencies
may require inter-agency coordination, but efforts to separately state the distributional
effects of regulatory actions are already well underway at some non-tax agencies,
including EPA.16
A4. Conclusion
To conclude: Although the marginal revenue rule can be applied using any value of g
and any set of distributional weights, we believe that Treasury and the IRS should
produce estimates of the efficiency effects of tax regulations on the assumption that a
dollar is worth a dollar regardless of who holds it. That assumption clearly is appropriate
if existing tax and spending policies are optimal. Even if the existing system is
nonoptimal, we believe that epistemic limitations, institutional design considerations, and
values of transparency and accountability all suggest that Treasury and the IRS should
proceed on the premise that a dollar is uniformly worth a dollar. The same arguments
apply to all agencies, tax and non-tax, considering regulations that have differential
distributional effects. Distributional consequences of tax and non-tax regulations should
not be ignored, but they should be discussed separately from agencies’ estimates of
efficiency effects.

15

See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Resource Center,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Pages/Tax-Analysis-and-Research.aspx (last updated
July 9, 2018).
16

U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, Office of Policy, Nat’l Ctr. for Envt’l Econ., Guidelines for Preparing
Economic Analyses 11-9 (updated May 2014).
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